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Abstract: We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical
measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination
pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution
system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls
the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a
microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this
time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed
output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different
SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to
this attack.
OCIS codes: (270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (270.5570) Quantum detectors; (030.5260)
Photon counting.
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1. Introduction
Quantum communication technologies offer information processing power having no ana-
logues in the classical world. For example, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] has been com-
mercialised [2]; secret sharing, quantum teleportation [3], entanglement swapping, bit com-
mitment, and blind quantum computation [4] have been demonstrated. To achieve quantum
communications at high speed and over long distance, single-photon detectors with high tim-
ing resolution and low noise are essential. Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs) [5] achieve the best combination of these parameters at 1550nm, the optimal wave-
length for long distance transmission over optical fiber.
The first proof-of-principle demonstration using SNSPDs in QKD was carried out with a
phase encoding system operating the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1, 6]. A high
bit rate, short wavelength (λ = 850nm) demonstration was then reported based on the Bennett
1992 (B92) protocol with polarization encoding [7,8]. A high bit rate long distance demonstra-
tion at λ = 1550nm was carried out at Stanford University [9] using the differential phase shift
(DPS) QKD protocol [10]. This first QKD demonstration in excess of 200km (40dB transmis-
sion loss) was achieved using SNSPDs with 0.7% efficiency at 1550nm, 10Hz dark count rate
and 60ps full-width at half-magnitude (FWHM) jitter [9]. Record bit rates were also achieved
at shorter distances, which was a significant improvement on the best QKD results achieved at
that time with InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) [11].
Since that study, many further QKD demonstrations have been reported using SNSPDs: the
maximum range was extended to 250km using low-loss fiber and implementing the coher-
ent one-way (COW) protocol [12,13], more recently extended to 260km with DPS-QKD [14];
decoy-state protocols [15] have been demonstrated [16,17]; entanglement-based QKD has been
demonstrated over long distance [18]; SNSPDs have been implemented in QKD field trials in
installed fiber networks [19–21]. A detailed comparison between SNSPDs and Si SPADs for
short haul high bit rate QKD has also been published [22]. Since this time SNSPD technology
has advanced rapidly [5] and near-unity efficiency coupled with low dark count rates is now
achievable [23]. These new high-performance SNSPDs have recently been deployed in inter-
facing quantum networks with quantum memories via teleportation [24], and are likely to be
employed in future QKD demonstrations. The 100-fold improvement in detection efficiency as
compared to early demonstrations [9] in principle allows for 100 times more fiber attenuation,
making QKD over up to 60dB channel loss feasible. While the current record for highest QKD
bit rate [25] has been achieved using SPADs, it is clear that SNSPDs are a vital technology in
the advancement of fiber-based QKD systems and networks particularly with the advent of next
generation SNSPDs with near-unity efficiency at telecom wavelengths [23].
Information security is an intrinsic feature of quantum communication protocols, guaranteed
in principle by the underlying laws of physics [26, 27]. However, the limitations of compo-
nents lead to vulnerability. Practical attacks breaking security of QKD have been proposed
and successfully demonstrated, by exploiting imperfections and behavior of real hardware not
accounted for in the theoretical treatment of security. Several of these attacks exploit imper-
fections of single-photon detectors, which have mostly been demonstrated on SPAD-based de-
tectors [28–33]. It has been shown by Lydersen et al. [34] that an SNSPD also has exploitable
imperfections, allowing bright-light blinding and deterministic control. A Japanese team has
recently applied this technique to explore the vulnerability of DPS-QKD systems and test a
countermeasure [35, 36]; however they have only investigated blinding of the detector but not
optimisation and properties of the fake pulses.
Here we extend the basic technique of detector control by testing and demonstrating this
vulnerability in several different SNSPD devices, using a realistic electronic bias and readout
that has been employed in QKD demonstrations [6]. We demonstrate optimised on-demand
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TABLE I. SNSPD devices tested, and their parameters.
Device number 1 2 3 4 5
Produced at Cambridge Cambridge NICT TU Delft TU Delft
Substrate Sapphire Quartz MgO SiO2 layer on Si
(simple optical
cavity)
SiO2 layer on Si
(simple optical
cavity)
Nanowire material NbN NbN NbN NbTiN NbTiN
Nanowire thickness, nm 8.8 8.8 4.2 6 6
Nanowire width, nm 70 100 100 100 80
Nanowire geometry 9.5× 9.5µm, 17
sections in series
each containing 4
parallel wires
8× 8µm, 11
sections in series
each containing 4
parallel wires
15× 15µm
meander
3× 3.5µm
meander
⊘11µm
meander
Scanning electron
microscope image
(contrast
enhanced to
emphasise
nanowire
geometry)
5 μm
Critical current, µAa 65 27 21 66 7.5
Critical temperature, K 10.1 8.7 11.1 8.0 9.8
Minimum blinding
power, dBma
-9.65 -17.85 -17.35 -23.65 -25.07
Maximum blinding
time τrecovery, ns
a
40 50 50 60 40
aMeasured at the operating temperature of 3.5K.
fake pulse generation. We also discuss and test non-ideal characteristics of the detector output
during the fake pulse generation, and countermeasures to this attack. Although we have only
tested stand-alone detectors, our findings reflect on the security of any QKD system that would
employ them.
2. Experiment
We have tested five SNSPD devices, summarised in Table 1. The majority of data presented
here was obtained from device 1. This detector is of the superconducting nanowire avalanche
photon detector (SNAP) type with sections of nanowires connected in parallel [37–41]. This
configuration is advantageous for reducing nanowire dimensions, in order to increase device
efficiency while maintaining usable current levels in the detector and for reducing reset times
for achieving higher count rates. This detector implementation is likely to be used in future
high speed and detector efficiency QKD systems. However for completeness a representative
range of detector types were tested. These included traditional meander-patterned devices on a
variety of substrates, such as those used in several practical demonstrations of QKD (device 3)
[21, 22]. Next-generation optical cavity enhanced detectors were included as well (devices 4
5
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup. SNSPD is cooled to 3.5K in a closed-cycle refrigerator, cus-
tom designed around a Cryomech PT-403 pulse tube cold head, and connected to room-
temperature electronics via ∼ 1m long 50Ω coaxial cable. The electronics consists of the
bias and readout circuits. The bias circuit is composed of a battery-powered low-noise
voltage source (Stanford Research Systems SIM928), 100kΩ resistor converting voltage
into bias current, two voltmeters (Stanford Research Systems SIM970), and low-pass fil-
ter (Mini-Circuits BLP-1.9+). The bias current is applied to the SNSPD via the direct-
current (DC) port of a bias tee (Picosecond Pulse Labs 5575A-104, 10kHz–12GHz radio-
frequency (RF) port bandwidth). The readout circuit uses two radio-frequency amplifiers
(RF Bay LNA-580, 23dB gain 10–580MHz bandwidth, and RF Bay LNA-1000, 33dB
gain 10MHz–1GHz bandwidth), and a DC block (Mini-Circuits BLK-18-S+, 10MHz–
18GHz bandwidth). The pulses are registered by either a counter (Agilent 53131A) or an
oscilloscope (Agilent Infiniium DSO80804A, 8GHz 40Gsamples/s). The SNSPD is illu-
minated via a single-mode fiber (Corning SMF28e) shown in red, by light formed by the
faked-state generator. The latter consists of a pulse pattern generator (Agilent 81110A),
two 1550nm semiconductor laser diodes (one Thorlabs LPS-1550-FC and one Thorlabs
LPSC-1550-FC), two optical variable attenuators (Hewlett-Packard 8156A) and a 50:50 ra-
tio fiber beamsplitter providing two identical optical outputs. One output is connected to the
SNSPD, while the other is monitored with a classical photodetector (Thorlabs DET01CFC,
DC–1.2GHz bandwidth).
& 5) [42], which are now becoming available for QKD implementations. The same blinding
attack technique was successful with all detector types.
Our experimental setup (Fig. 1) represents a typical detector configuration used in QKD ex-
periments [6]. The SNSPD device is biased at about 0.9 of its critical current (specific device
properties such as critical current at the operating temperature are listed in Table 1). The bias is
applied by a battery-powered low-noise current source connected via a bias tee. The important
feature of the scheme is the presence of a shunt resistor Rshunt that prevents latching (typically
a 50Ω resistor) [43]. This resistor creates a low-impedance mismatch point ∼ 1m away from
the SNSPD along the 50Ω coaxial radio-frequency (RF) cable. A reverse-polarity pulse re-
flected from this impedance mismatch reaches the SNSPD about 10ns after hotspot formation,
and lowers the voltage across the device. If the hotspot has failed to dissipate and persists by
Joule self-heating, this reflected pulse can remove electrical power from it aiding reset from
the latched state. On longer timescales it is important that the shunt resistance is much lower
than the SNSPD hotspot resistance. The shunt resistor provides an alternate current path, re-
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Fig. 2. Output pulses from the experimental setup described in Fig. 1 under normal single-
photon illumination (red trace) and under bright-light illumination manipulating the de-
tector (black trace). Laser illumination for the blinded case is illustrated by the plot shading.
Time t = 0ns is the point at which the fake output pulse is triggered.
ducing current flow through the detector allowing cooling back to the superconducting state.
The latter recovery mechanism is of particular importance to the detector blinding attack de-
scribed in this paper. In this circuit configuration, SNSPD can be reliably operated at a higher
bias current and higher photon detection efficiency than in the configuration without Rshunt.
The pulse readout circuit consists of AC-coupled amplifiers with combined gain of 56dB and
10–580MHz frequency range. The detector output signal is observed with an electronic counter
and an oscilloscope. The SNSPD is illuminated via single-mode fiber connected to the output of
a faked-state generator. The faked-state generator allows the formation of arbitrary illumination
diagrams with two distinct optical power levels at the SNSPD, in addition to zero power level.
This is achieved with a pulse pattern generator powering two 1550nm laser diodes, followed by
optical variable attenuators to set the power levels. The output of the faked-state generator sim-
ulates illumination diagrams that the SNSPD would receive if it were a part of a QKD system
under attack [34].
A typical output pulse from this setup is shown in Fig. 2, triggered by the incidence of
a single photon. The normal character of an SNSPD output pulse includes a sharp leading
edge as the detector becomes resistive and the current is forced out, followed by a slower
recovery as the current returns to the detector. The shape of the observed recovery signal is
highly dependent on amplifier bandwidths and reflections from components (such as the shunt
resistor used in this setup). Note that this oscilloscope trace is not an accurate representation of
the current flow returning to the device. The critical part of the pulse is the sharp clean leading
edge on which counting electronics is normally triggered, providing the advantageous timing
properties of SNSPDs. The observed leading edge is also dependent on amplifier bandwidth
and hotspot resistance [44]. Hotspot growth time (typically < 100ps [45,46]) is normally short
in comparison to the observed pulse rise time. In our experimental setup, the latter is limited by
the first 580MHz bandwidth amplifier (Fig. 1).
Lydersen et al. considered artificially generating pulses in SNSPDs through two methods
[34]. The first involved latching the detector into the resistive state, through a short bright-light
illumination, from which the detector does not recover. Fake detector pulses were generated
through subsequent bright pulses causing variation of the device resistance. However, this at-
7
tack is effectively defeated by the inclusion of a shunt resistor [43] (or other reset circuit) as
implemented in our standard experimental setup (Fig. 1), and also in some QKD demonstra-
tions [6] in order to allow stable long-term detector operation. In this paper we describe the
extension of the second method put forward by Lydersen et al. of blinding the detectors to in-
coming single photons through continuous bright-light illumination (of the order of 1 to 100
µW in this study depending on individual SNSPD characteristics). We find that with careful
control it is possible to generate fake detector output signals reliably on-demand with timing
properties better than in the single-photon case.
3. Detector control
3.1. Applicability to different QKD schemes
Since our testing was performed on a stand-alone detector, we need to briefly address the ques-
tion how this applies to hacking a complete QKD system. In a detector control attack, Eve
performs an intercept-resend in the transmission line. She uses a replica of Bob’s setup to de-
tect all quantum states emitted from Alice, then generates and sends bright-light faked states to
Bob that attempt to replicate Eve’s detection results in Bob’s detectors [47, 48]. Note that Bob
has two or more detectors. The simplest version of this attack requires that Eve can specify de-
terministically which detector in Bob clicks and when it clicks, at her will. To do so she needs
to form bright-light pattern at the target detector that causes it to click with 100% probability,
while all other detectors in Bob receive bright-light pattern that keeps them silent. The hacking
method employed by Eve, and the sucess thereof, depends on the optical layout in Bob. For
the purpose of the following analysis, we can broadly classify Bob’s optical schemes into three
categories.
The first category contains passive measurement schemes in which Eve can, by choosing
appropriate polarization or phase of bright light, reduce light power at a selected detector by
20dB (100 times) or more for an arbitrary time period, while keeping the other detectors illumi-
nated [48]. Examples of such schemes are passive-basis-choice BB84 protocol and DPS-QKD
protocol. The 20dB figure is a typical extinction ratio of Bob’s polarization- or phase-selective
component, such as a polarizing beamsplitter or Mach-Zehnder interferometer. While the power
at the selected detector is reduced greatly, other detectors in Bob may receive excess power in
the form of a surge of up to 3dB (a twofold increase in power) [34,48]. Most QKD schemes so
far tested with SNSPDs are of this type [7, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22]. We thus base our stand-alone
detector testing on a control diagram that alternates between 20dB optical power drop and 3dB
surge around a steady blinding power level, as will be detailed in Section 3.2.
A second smaller category contains schemes where Bob uses a randomly-driven modulator
for active basis choice in BB84 protocol [6, 16]. In these schemes Eve can drop power at the
target detector by 20dB conditional on a specific basis choice by Bob, while for other basis
choices the power at all detectors will stay around the blinding level [29,48]. The time duration
for which Bob keeps one choice of basis applied to his modulator presents an additional con-
straint on Eve. If this time is greater than the time duration for which Eve needs to reduce the
power delivered to the target detector, then her attack is in essence equivalent to the previous
category. However in high-speed QKD implementations this condition may not hold and Eve’s
life becomes more complicated. In the latter case the devil is in the details: Eve may or may
not be able to hack, depending on the exact particulars of the technical implementation. We
do not consider the latter case, because there is no stable reference QKD implementation that
we could obtain and examine in detail. Unfortunately all QKD implementations using SNSPDs
have to date been laboratory prototypes – no complete commercial system yet exists.
A third, also smaller, category contains certain time-bin encoding schemes in which one
or more detectors are essentially connected straight to the communication line and are not
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selective on any light parameter. These include implementations of COW protocol [12] and
time-bin-encoded BB84 protocol [19]. In these schemes Eve will again be constrained by the
exact details of the technical implementation (among other details, by the splitting ratio of the
asymmetric beamsplitter [49]), and will have to analyse detector behavior beyond the level
tested in this paper.
Looking beyond the optical layout in Bob, the readout circuitry can also affect Eve’s attack
strategy. The discriminator circuits used to convert the analog pulse shown in Fig. 2 into a
digital detection signal vary, and are never described in sufficient detail in papers about QKD
implementations. For example, it is usually not stated at what level the discriminator threshold
is set. SNSPD pulse shape has the steepest and cleanest gradient mid-way through the leading
edge, making 50% of the output peak height a sensible robust choice of discriminator level
for-low jitter QKD operation. We thus assume in our testing that Bob uses a fast constant-level
discriminator with threshold set at 50% of the single-photon pulse height. As will be obvious
below, the attack works in a range of discriminator levels centered around 50%, and Section 3.3
discusses how fake pulse height can be varied during attack optimisation.
3.2. On-demand fake pulse generation
When illuminated with a bright ‘blinding’ pulse of light, the detector becomes resistive over a
larger area than the single hotspot generated by single photon absorption. In the single-photon
detection case the resistive region, or hotspot, grows due to Joule heating with the energy de-
pendent upon I2L, where I is the bias current and L is the kinetic inductance of the detector.
Once the bias current is shunted out from the detector, the hotspot dissipates on a time scale de-
termined by the rethermalisation of the nanowire with the substrate. This mechanism has been
modelled in detail by others [45, 46].
In the bright-light case, we suggest that the resistive region is maintained through the direct
absorption of the incident laser power in excess of the rethermalisation or cooling power of
the SNSPD environment. It is interesting to note that very approximately, given bias current of
the order of 10µA, kinetic inductance of 1µH and hotspot formation time of 100ps, the power
dissipated during hotspot formation is ∼ 1µW. This power is sufficient to cause the hotspot to
grow rather than rethermalise. This agrees well with the blinding powers required to maintain
the devices in a resistive state (> 1µW or −30dBm, see Table 1).
Under blinding illumination, current is diverted from the detector causing an output pulse
[see pulse at t ∼−200ns in Fig. 3(b) and 3(e)]. If the bright illumination continues, the detector
remains in the resistive state and is no longer sensitive to incident photons. However, if the
bright illumination is stopped (or its power is decreased sufficiently, 20dB attenuation is shown
to be sufficient in Fig. 3) for a short period of time (e.g., < 50ns), the nanowire rethermalises. It
then once more becomes superconducting, and the current starts to return to the detector at a rate
defined by the superconducting kinetic inductance of the SNSPD L and the circuit resistance.
Recovery of the SNSPD after the blinding attack is somewhat different than recovery from
single photon detection. Excess laser power has been absorbed into the detector, driving a large
area resistive and causing a local rise in temperature. The need to rethermalise in addition
to the normal return of current to the SNSPD extends recovery timescales dependent on the
excess blinding energy deposited (or timescale of the attack). If enough of the bias current was
allowed to return to the detector, it would once more become single-photon sensitive (after
time τrecovery), and would also exhibit dark counts. Note that it does not require the full bias
current to have returned to the nanowire before the detector can exhibit a photoresponse or
produce dark counts [23, 50]. However, if the bright illumination is re-applied before this time,
after τOFF < τrecovery optimised experimentally in this work, the proportion of the current that
had already returned to the detector is again forced out as the nanowire returns to the resistive
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Fig. 3. Simulated control diagrams two detectors would receive inside Bob whose scheme
allows to redistribute optical power between the detectors (i.e., measurement scheme of the
first category in Section 3.1). Detectors are controlled through blinding with a bright laser
pulse at time t = −200ns, followed by variation of the blinding laser power by −20dB
on detector 0, and corresponding variation of +3dB on detector 1. Optical power at both
detectors during the attack is shown in oscilloscope traces (a) and (d), while analog detector
outputs are shown in oscilloscope traces (b) and (e). Corresponding logic pulses obtained
by passing the analog signal through a 50% fixed-threshold discriminator are shown in (c)
and (f).
state. This elicits another controlled fake output pulse from the detector while maintaining the
SNSPD in a ‘blinded’ state. An example of this fake pulse is shown in Fig. 2. This is the basis
of the detector attack described in this paper.
In the manner described above, an attacker can blind an SNSPD and elicit ‘fake’ output
pulses on-demand. This is shown explicitly in the top half of Fig. 3. An initial output pulse
occurs when the blinding illumination is initiated at t ∼ −200ns, and subsequent controlled
pulses are generated on-demand through brief reductions in the blinding illumination for time
τOFF < τrecovery (in this case τOFF = 20ns). Once the control diagram was optimised, a fake
output pulse occurred on every observed attempt in the authors’ experiment with apparent 100%
probability.
In order to achieve successful manipulation of the variety of SNSPDs tested in this work,
some variation of parameters was needed, primarily blinding power and τrecovery (see Table 1).
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Devices were biased and operated as the authors would normally use them in experiments; only
blinding attack parameters were optimised. While new generations of SNSPDs with near-unity
detection efficiency using new materials such as tungsten silicide [23] were not tested in this
study, their operating principle is the same. Variations in thermal and electrical properties are
likely to require similar optimisation of the blinding parameters, but no change in the principle
of the attack. In practice it may seem impractical to determine the correct blinding parameters
to attack a system. However we assume, in accordance with Kerckhoffs’ principle [51] (a cryp-
tosystem should be secure even if everything about the system except the key is public knowl-
edge), that the attacker knows all details of the devices, settings and protocols used. In practice,
as detectors and commercial QKD systems develop, it is likely the detectors will have highly
repeatable characteristics. It then becomes realistic to fully dismantle and analyse a sample of
a commercial product to obtain starting values of these parameters in advance of attacking a
QKD implementation. The attack may then begin to be applied intermittently while analysing
the public communication between Alice and Bob and fine-tuning attack parameters [47, 52].
Eve would subsequently switch over to continuous attack with real-time adjustment of param-
eters, if necessary.
3.3. Pulse and recovery characteristics
The characteristics of the fake pulse seen in Fig. 2 are qualitatively similar to those of the real
pulse: a sharp leading edge followed by a slow recovery. Amplitude of the fake pulse is re-
duced, because only a fraction of the full device current has returned to the detector before the
fake pulse is triggered. If a longer pause is left before resuming the full blinding laser power,
the fake pulse amplitude is increased. However, with pauses of duration closely approaching
τrecovery , there is a finite probability of a count occurring during the recovery from the blinded
state, which is undesirable for full detector control. For the fake pulse outputs demonstrated in
this paper, τOFF was kept sufficiently below τrecovery (in this case τOFF = 20ns). Then counts due
to recovery from the blinded state did not occur during the attack, instead the fake pulse was
generated returning the detector to the blinded state. This was confirmed in the good jitter char-
acteristics of the fake pulses, discussed in Section 3.4. Fake pulse amplitude can be increased
at the cost of a finite probability of a detector pulse occurring before the intended fake pulse.
However, counts during recovery from the blinded state are common if the blinding attack is
stopped (e.g., t > 400ns in Fig. 3), occurring with a probability 10–16% when the detector is
blinded for 1–10µs, see Fig. 4. The recovery of the detector from the blinded state is different
from normal single-photon detection recovery (which can also stimulate afterpulsing [50]), as
in the blinded case the detector must rethermalise to the base temperature before the system
fully returns to normal operation. If carefully applied, the blinding power need not heat the de-
tector excessively and the thermalisation time only slightly extends the recovery, which is still
dominated by the current return time to the detector. However the dynamics of this recovery are
affected by the temperature from which the SNSPD is rethermalising, hence the dependence
of afterpulsing probability on blinding duty cycle as in Fig. 4. An additional contribution to
afterpulses may be single-photon detection of photons delayed in the optical scheme via mul-
tiple back-and-forth reflections of the bright blinding pulse. The observed output signal during
recovery from the blinded state is most clearly seen in Fig. 3(e) after t = 350ns.
The presence of afterpulses should not stop the attack. In Fig. 3(b) at t = 0ns two fake pulses
are generated at a repetition period of 30ns. After the first pulse, 10ns of bright light is required
to return the detector to the blinded state before a second fake pulse can be generated with
τOFF = 20ns. In this manner, fake pulses can be generated at a repetition rate of 33MHz. While
these parameters vary between detectors (see last row in Table 1), by the very nature of the
attack discussed above τOFF is kept well below τrecovery (in this case at 50%). In normal QKD
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Fig. 4. Probability of an afterpulse occurring when the blinding pulse is stopped, dependent
on the fraction of the time the detector is illuminated by the blinding pulse. Blinding attack
repetition rate was kept constant at 10kHz, while blinding pulse duration was varied. Since
many fake pulses would be generated during each blinding cycle, fake detection rate would
be much higher than 10kHz.
operation, the maximum single-photon detection rate would be 1/τrecovery with a unity efficiency
detector. The hacker can match or better this rate, with significant further gains available when
compared to a non-unity efficiency single photon detector in Bob.
For the detector studied in detail in this paper, if kept under Eve’s control for 10µs every
100µs, an afterpulse will occur 16% of the time (Fig. 4). In each 10µs cycle the hacker can
generate 333 fake pulses, or if matching the maximum single photon detection rate only 250
fake pulses, with an average of 0.16 afterpulses. As such, afterpulses per fake pulse occur at a
rate of 0.06%, adding only a small contribution to the error rate.
3.4. Jitter
For good detector control, the timing jitter of the fake electrical output pulses must be compa-
rable or better than that of the real response. This is shown in Fig. 5. As long as the pause in
the blinding pulse is kept below τrecovery, the jitter achieved is as good or better than for single-
photon response, for all detectors tested. While normal SNSPDs suffer from some variation in
timing response over the detector area due to varying hotspot resistance of ∼ 1kΩ [44], in the
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Fig. 5. Comparison of timing jitter measured in the experimental setup described in Fig. 1,
for device 1. Timing distribution due to single-photon illumination (red circles) and manip-
ulation through bright-light illumination (black squares) is shown, together with Gaussian
fits. FWHM time widths are 160 and 141ps, respectively. Jitter is measured at a fixed
threshold level set at 50% of the amplitude of a single-photon detection pulse.
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case of the blinding attack the SNSPD switches to a very high resistance every time, giving a
sharper leading edge to the pulse and improved timing jitter.
Additionally, for the real single-photon case shown in Fig. 5 a tail is observed on the jitter
histogram, characteristic of the avalanche process for parallel wire (SNAP) detectors [37–41]
(devices 1 & 2). The tail is not observed for the standard meander SNSPDs (devices 3–5). This
tail is not present in the fake jitter histogram for any of the five devices, as the higher power of
the blinding pulse ensures immediate cascade of the detector into the resistive state. Improved
FWHM characteristics of the faked detector response for all detectors tested offer Eve some
leeway in her hacking attack: for example, improved error rate here may be used to compensate
for any increased errors due to afterpulses.
3.5. Summary
Experimental results obtained with simulated control diagrams shown in Fig. 3 show that the
detectors are successfully manipulated with only 20dB variation in blinding power. These
diagrams should be fully reproducible when attacking the majority of QKD schemes using
SNSPDs [7, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22], making these schemes vulnerable to the detector control at-
tack. The control diagrams can be adapted to minor variations between individual detectors in
the QKD system, such as different values of τrecovery and minimum blinding power. For the re-
maining QKD schemes [6,12,16,19] these control diagrams may not directly apply, yet should
be good starting point for refining the attack. For the latter schemes, detailed investigation of
the implementation details and a tailored advanced attack tactics would be required. For ex-
ample, for an active basis choice scheme that switches measurement bases faster than τrecovery ,
Eve could try to send faked states tailored to certain sequences of bases. We did not investigate
these schemes owing to the lack of a stable reference implementation such as a commercial
QKD system that uses SNSPDs.
4. Countermeasures
An attack such as that described in this paper will always be dependent on the exact configura-
tion of the QKD system. This paper attempts to demonstrate that vulnerability to attack exists in
stand-alone SNSPDs of all configurations available to the authors, with only minor adjustment
of parameters (see last two rows in Table 1). A further investigation would have to target a com-
plete QKD system containing SNSPDs. This would be a level of effort outside the scope of this
paper, especially as no commercial QKD systems using SNSPDs are yet available as a bench-
mark. However, it is worth considering countermeasures that may remove this vulnerability in
the future.
There are two main forms of countermeasure available to eliminate the security loophole
demonstrated here. The preferred action is to include the equipment imperfections in the se-
curity model, as for example is done in the measurement-device-independent QKD scheme
[53–55] where the detector system is moved outside of the security proof. However, in prac-
tice, patches to rule out already demonstrated attacks on existing systems are often considered
first, while not offering any guarantee that the vulnerability can be eliminated [56–59]. Below
we give some ideas for these latter kind of ‘band-aid’ countermeasures applicable to the attack
described here.
As mentioned in section 2, the inclusion of Rshunt in the experimental design shown in Fig. 1
offers a countermeasure to the first attack described by Lydersen et al. [34]. Alternate reset
circuits including systems which actively reset the bias to avoid detector latching may have
significant implications for the operation of the attack and may form the basis of a countermea-
sure. It may be that such active reset circuits are once again vulnerable to the first type of attack
described by Lydersen et al. [34]. Due to lack of availability to the authors, such active reset
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circuits have not been investigated in this work.
For the passive reset circuit described here, a countermeasure uses the feature that if the de-
tector under blinding attack from bright-light illumination is under DC electrical monitoring,
a small increase in the average resistance can be observed, limited by Rshunt. This manifests
itself as a measurable average voltage drop across the DC bias port (measured by voltmeter
V2 in Fig. 1), dependent on the duty cycle of the blinding attack. The reading on V2 increased
linearly from 0.2mV to 0.5mV with blinding duty cycle varying from 0 to 50%. This is at
the limit of the resolution of the standard voltmeter used here. The fractional change in meas-
ured resistance was slight in this demonstration especially at short blinding pulse duration (or
blinding duty cycle). It can be imagined that more sensitive device monitoring of the correct
bandwidth may enable easier detection of attacks that put the detector into a resistive state for a
greater time than expected in normal operation. However, it should be noted that in high bit rate
QKD the detector will be running at close to its maximum count rate. After each count, during
detector recovery, a finite resistance would also be measured on V2. The wise hacker injecting
high bit rate fake detector pulses will be aware of this and may be able to keep the blinding
duty cycle low, keeping variation on V2 comparable to that caused by high bit rate QKD. It can
be imagined that attacks may be limited to short periods of detector blinding.
A further countermeasure could be implemented as follows: The shape of the fake output
pulses in this attack are highly dependent on the amplifiers used in the system. The setup used
here is the standard arrangement employed in the majority of the authors’ work. Real and fake
pulses demonstrated here have the same important features (see Fig. 2), suitable for triggering
a discriminator in a QKD system. However, we also tested other configurations of amplifiers.
The leading edge of the fake pulse is maintained with the range of amplifiers tested. However,
if DC-coupled amplifiers are used (instead of the AC-coupled standard amplifier chain in Fig. 1
that has 10MHz low frequency cut-off), a different characteristic is seen. While the detector is
in the blinded state, a constant output level is observed, only relaxing during the recovery phase.
A pulse is still observed when the detector is switched to the blinding state, but the recovery
does not match that of a real pulse. This would still be suitable for triggering many types of
discriminators. The situation may be further complicated by the use of cryogenic amplifiers,
or complete superconducting readout circuits [60] currently being developed. If a fast analog-
to-digital converter (ADC) is used after the analog electronics instead of a simple threshold
discriminator, it may be possible to distinguish real and fake pulses via more detailed automated
analysis of the signal shape.
Further countermeasures of this type may also be possible, trying to distinguish distorted
pulse shape and other abnormalities. However the authors believe that the type of attack de-
scribed here is less dependent on the precise electrical circuit than the latched-state attack orig-
inally described by Lydersen et al. [34], and could be developed further by potential hackers in
response to simple countermeasures.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated further vulnerabilities in SNSPDs used in QKD sys-
tems. The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate the detailed operation of an attack
on SNSPDs and moreover to consider the weaknesses of such an attack. Although hacking of
a real QKD system has not been demonstrated, this study nevertheless provides an important
signposting for future QKD system development. This bright-light blinding and control has
been successfully demonstrated on a range of currently available SNSPD devices of different
types on a variety of substrates. The attack has been shown to produce fake pulses and pulse
trains on-demand with timing characteristics better than the detector’s normal response. It has
been shown that for many QKD schemes, multiple detectors in Bob could be controlled indi-
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vidually. As such, it is suggested that careful consideration of the full QKD system and security
model including detectors is needed in the development of commercial apparatus, before robust
security claims can be made.
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